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Abstract  
This thesis was dedicated to explain mainland China’s fast economic growth and high 
inequality from the approach of economic transition and to answer the question why 
economic transitions contrast in mainland China and Taiwan. Combined with both 
qualitative and quantitative strategies, and based on secondary data as well as official 
statistics, the thesis chose comparative study as research design. After two 
comparative studies, this thesis found that mainland China is also a model of 
agricultural-development-led industrialization as Taiwan, which largely contributed to 
the fast economic growth; and yet uneven economic transition among provinces in 
mainland China resulted in serious intra-rural and national inequality.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Research problem  
During the last 30 years the whole world has witnessed the long-term and fast 
economic growth in mainland China1
 
. The “Reform and Opening-Up” in 1978 was a 
watershed of China’s economy growth: from a stagnant economy since the beginning 
of the Cultural Revolution to one with long lasting and fast economic growth after the 
Asian miracle economies or the new industrialized economies (NIEs). From 1978 to 
2005, the average annual growth rate of GDP was 9.6 percent and 8.5 percent for 
GDP per capita (Naughton, 2007, p 140).  
The fast economic growth brought great achievements in China’s social-economic 
development. China’s Human development index (HDI) during economic reform 
increased from 0.557 in 1980 to 0.755 in 2003, and HDI global ranking rose from 
101st in 1991 to 85th in 2003 (UNDP and CDRF, 2005, p 7). We can also find an 
extraordinary decline of the number of absolute poverty since 1978. Measured by 
official poverty line, rural residents who lived in poverty was reduced from 250 
million, more than 30 percent of the total population, in 1978, to 26 million, less than 
5 percent, in 2004, while the urban poverty only contributed a negligible portion of 
national poverty (Naughton, 2007, p 212; Ravallion and Chen, 2007, p 7 and 8). 
Ravallion and Chen (2007) adjusted the poverty line in comparison to international 
standards. Although with a short term reverse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their 
calculation also shows an evident downward trend of China’s poverty: from 52.84 
percent of the total population in 1981 to 7.97 percent in 2001(p 10). 
 
However, along with China’s economic growth, the Gini coefficient also 
continuously increased since the 1980s, from below 0.3 before 1986 to 0.447 in 2001 
                                                             
1  “Mainland  China”  (zhongguo  dalu)  refers  to  China  on  the  Asian  continent  without  Hong  Kong  and  Macao 
Special Administrative regions. And in this thesis “China” also stands for “mainland China”. “Taiwan, China” equals 
to “Taiwan” or “Taipei, China”. 
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(Naughton, 2007, p 218; UNDP and CDRF, 2005, p 13). Moreover, one feature of 
mainland China’s inequality is that it is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, 
which contrasts to other developing countries (Ravallion and Chen, 2007, p 2). 
Another feature, shared by most developing countries, is the enlargement of 
urban-rural household income gap.  
 
Here the thesis restricts economic development within economic growth, poverty 
alleviation and income distribution, which can be measured respectively by the 
nation’s GDP, poverty line (official poverty line and “one-dollar” poverty line) and 
Gini Coefficient. China’ economic development pattern may be explained by the logic 
of Simon Kuznets (1955) that inequality will increase during the initial stage of 
economic growth and, as we could expect in China, it will decline in subsequent 
stages. More than enough counterparts are available even among Asian NIEs, in 
which fast economic growth came along with both poverty alleviation and inequality2
 
.  
Now we encounter a debate on efficiency and equity in economic development. 
Based on the Harrod-Domar model, growth depends on the quantity of labour and 
capital, and high investment and accumulation will bring economic growth. Therefore, 
high profit and saving rates are viewed as indispensable factors and the improvement 
of income distribution becomes a trade-off with the object of growth (Ranis, 2005, p 
122). But is there any other way for economic development? Quite a few countries 
have been assessed as counter-examples which proved that the inverse U-shaped 
Kuznets curve is not an inevitable route of economic development (ibid., p 128). 
 
Taiwan is one of such counter-examples of rapid economic growth associated with 
                                                             
2  Quibria (2002) believes that economic growth, poverty and income inequality are closely intertwined. Poverty 
alleviation  results  from  both  economic  growth  that  increases  household  income  and  improved  income 
distribution: 
P*=E(y)y*+E(i)i* 
(P*is the rate if change in poverty in the inequality indicators, y* is the rate of change in per capita, i* is the rate 
of change in the inequality indicators, E(y) is the growth elasticity, and E (i) is the inequality of poverty.) 
    For Asian NIEs, Quibria  (2002)  argues  that  the main  impetus  for poverty  alleviation  is  fast  economic  growth 
with insignificant effort from improvement of income distribution (p 13‐14).   
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improved household income distribution, which is in contrast to mainland China. The 
economy in Taiwan maintained high growth rates from 1970s to 1996 (Quibria, 2002, 
p 8) and poverty reduced sharply from 47% in 1965 to 3% in 1985 based on the 
national poverty line (ibid., p 9). At the same time, Gini Coefficient in Taiwan stayed 
at a low level, with average Gini of 0.2962 from 1964 to 1993 (Deininger and Squire, 
1996, p 575). Before we deal with the issue of to which extent the mainland China’s 
development is different from Taiwan’s, more similarities have been found. 
 
Quibria (2002) has summarized various factors behind the East Asian miracle, a 
majority of them are also shared by mainland China, such as economic openness, 
benign macroeconomic environment created by an authoritarian government and 
favorable initial conditions (equitable income and high literacy rate) (p 22). We may 
find more factors in common between mainland China and Taiwan, if we look into the 
economic transition processes of the two economies. In the very beginning of 
economic development, land reform was launched by governments in both mainland 
China and Taiwan. The land reform between 1949 and 1953, and Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) were the most efficient incentive in respective 
agricultural sectors, and helped to improve agricultural productivity and peasants’ 
incomes. Also at the same stage governments spared no effort to promote agricultural 
production by introducing advanced agricultural technology. In the subsequent stage 
or since the beginning rural industries started booming in the countryside 
accompanied with the sustainable growth of agricultural production. Those rural 
industries were featured with small scale labor-intensive production, and maintained 
close connections with the agricultural sector3
 
. It appears that economic transitions in 
China and Taiwan were both focused and led by agriculture. 
1.2. Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this research is to explain mainland China’s fast economic growth and 
                                                             
3  Based on discussion in Naughton (2007) and Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979). 
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deterioration of income distribution from the approach of economic transition 
comparing with Taiwan’s economic development. There are two ambitions in this 
research.  
 
First, this research will explore the economic transitions in Taiwan and China based 
on the agriculture-led economic development theory proposed by John Mellor. Taiwan 
is a perfect model of agriculture-led economic development4
 
, moreover it seems that 
China surprisingly shared many common factors which emphasized the agricultural 
development at the start of transition, thus, it deserves an examination of to what 
extant mainland China fits the agriculture-led economic development pattern.  
If mainland China matches the agriculture-led economic development model and 
agricultural development was indeed favored in the early stage of economic 
development, then why does the case of mainland China counter one of the social 
effects of that development model: improved income distribution? Because of vast 
territory and diversified natural endowments in different regions, adverse or positive 
effects among regions or provinces may be generated and intensified towards 
economic development of the whole economy. Hence, the other ambition is to carry a 
provincial or regional study of mainland China also from the angle of agriculture-led 
economic development,  
 
From the above ambitions, the main research question is why economic transitions 
between mainland China and Taiwan contrast. There follows several sub research 
questions that the study will attempt to answer: What are the similarities between 
mainland China and Taiwan in agriculture emphasized development? Does the case of 
mainland China fit the model of agriculture-led economic development? If the answer 
is positive, what are the factors behind contrast outcomes of economic development 
of the two economies on the extent of income distribution? Why does Gini coefficient, 
particularly the rural one increase in mainland China with the fast economic growth? 
                                                             
4  See chapter 1, 2 and 11 in Mellor (1995). 
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What are the differences in economic development among provinces in mainland 
China? Do all provinces in mainland China share one economic transition model? 
 
1.3. Methodological framework  
1.3.1.  Research design  
This research is designed to be a non-experimental comparative study including both 
qualitative and quantitative research strategies. Comparative study embodies a logic 
in which “we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in 
relation to two or more meaningful contrasting cases or situations” (Bryman, 2004, p 
53). In the context of quantitative strategy, comparative study is close to a 
cross-sectional design format; while within qualitative strategy, comparative study 
takes the form of a multiple-case study (ibid., p 53, 55). Taiwan and mainland China 
are placed into two contradictory conditions of income distribution in economic 
transition, and there could be uneven paces of economic transitions among provinces, 
so a comparative study design fits the research purpose. First there is a qualitative 
research of these two economies by comparing various aspects of industrialization. 
This research is helpful in understanding the sequences of industrialization from 
Mellor’s theory and more importantly generating a theory of whether mainland China 
resembles Taiwan in industrialization. The following quantitative research is going to 
test a hypothesis, raised in the beginning of the fourth section, that there is no general 
model of industrialization among provinces. Percentages of agricultural and 
nonagricultural output among 30 provinces are selected as variables. Finally this 
thesis will provide a new explanation of mainland China’s transition and its 
implication to income distribution through a thick description of provincial transition 
patterns, after a series of processes of coding concepts about economic transition, 
categorizing the provinces and exploring the relationship between categories. 
 
1.3.2. Data collection  
All data is secondary, including statistical yearbooks, research articles and official 
 6 
 
reports. Data from China statistical yearbook (from 1981 to 2008) , and China’s 
labour statistical yearbook (1999) were collected from “China Data Online” of All 
China Data Center5
 
 which is authorized by National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). Lin and Yang (2001) deal with mainland China rural enterprises’ growth 
together with a complete analysis of factors behind the growth. Though they found 
regional diversity in the mainland, provincial analysis was not carried out. Naughton 
(2007) provides a comprehensive monograph on China’s economy and served as one 
of the most important literature and data sources in this thesis.  
Data for Taiwan’s economic development were adequately and systematically 
collected, processed and presented in discussion of “growth with equity” (Fei, Ranis 
and Kuo), agriculture-led economic development (Mao and Chi, 1995) and East Asian 
Miracle (Quibria, 2002). Thus this thesis will use academic articles and books as data 
sources instead of original statistical data, since those literatures are closely connected 
with this thesis and data in them are in good quality.  
 
  On income distribution and poverty, main secondary data sources are Ravallion and 
Chen (2004) and Khan and Riskin (1998 and 2005). Ravallion and Chen (2004) 
provided a careful analysis of relationship among growth, inequality and poverty 
based on Rural Household Survey and Urban Household Survey carried by NBSC. 
Using smaller samples from surveys carried by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), Khan and Riskin (1998 and 2005) carried a research of inequality by 
analyzing rural and urban household income in 1988, 1995 and 2002. They both got 
similar conclusions of mainland China’s inequality respectively, though their data 
sources were different. 
 
1.3.3. Criticism of the Sources 
Data of mainland China and provinces are mainly from China statistical yearbooks 
from 1981 to 2008, and China labour statistical yearbooks, which are the long-term 
                                                             
5  All China Data Center is accessible at: http://chinadataonline.org/. 
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and most reliable data sources. However, these data suffer flaws including influences 
from government attitudes, changes of calculation and criteria, and diversified 
statistical categories from 1980s to 2000s.  
 
  Data of rural enterprises are only available from 1981 to 1999 in China statistical 
yearbook. In early 1980s the data collection was largely limited because rural 
enterprises were treated as auxiliary part of agricultural sector; after, more tables were 
available on several criteria of rural enterprises’ development. Ownership was 
probably the most important criteria at early 1980s, and private-owned rural 
enterprises were overlooked until yearbook 1984. The data collection discontinued 
after 1999 but then showed up again in yearbook 2003. Moreover, the data of total 
output of rural enterprises are only available from yearbook 1981 to 1996. After 1996 
the yearbooks diverted their focus to total income of rural enterprises.  
 
  There are also a few errors of numbers in those yearbooks not to mention some data 
that are slightly different among yearbooks. For example, there are extremely sharp 
and large declines of both numbers of rural enterprises and employment in 1997 in 
China labour statistical yearbook 1999. In that instance, data were carefully compared 
with other yearbooks, and finally replaced by data from China statistical yearbook of 
2003. China statistical yearbook of township and village enterprises could be one of 
the main sources of data, especially in quantitative research part. Unfortunately, it 
wasn’t available during this research.  
 
  There are shortcomings that may be hard to avoid in the secondary analysis and 
official statistics, including lack of familiarity with data, complexity of data, no 
control of data, and especially the change of definition that mentioned above. Some of 
them might even jeopardize the reliability of data (Bryman, 2004, p 205, 211). 
However, the advantages of secondary analysis and official statistics will not be 
obscured. Those data can not only support both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analysis among mainland China’s provinces, but also make cross-cultural (economic) 
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analysis applicable for mainland China and Taiwan (ibid., p 202, 209).  
 
1.4. Disposition of the research  
After the introduction, section 2 on the approach and theoretical framework of 
agriculture-led economic development will follow. That part is going to summarize 
mainly John Mellor’s theory with an emphasis on explanations of the reasons for 
agricultural development in the early stage and relations between agricultural and 
industrial development. Moreover, the second subsection will elaborate in Mellor’s 
theory on how poverty reduction and income distribution improvement are influenced 
by this development model. Based on the summaries of section 2, section 3 will 
compare Taiwan and mainland China’s economic development especially in rural 
areas. Both similarities and disparities during economic transitions in both economies 
from agricultural sector to nonagricultural sectors will be discussed. 
 
The fourth section is dedicated to explore the possible differences in development 
among provinces in mainland China, and answer the question whether mainland 
China in the provincial level follows one general model of economic development. 
Combined with the previous section, the fourth one will finally try to propose an 
integrated explanation of economic transition in mainland China. Section 5 intends to 
solve the income distribution problem from the approach of agriculture-led economic 
development, mainly based on the explanation of mainland China’s economic 
transition. 
 
The final section is going to first present an answer for the research question and 
then try to bring the discussion beyond China: what are the implications for other 
developing countries?  
 
1.5. Delimitations of this research 
Mellor’s agriculture-led-economic development theory which includes five social 
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achievements beyond economic growth: urbanization, poverty reduction, growth of 
private sector, democratization and income distribution6
 
, is a comprehensive theory of 
economic transition from an agrarian economy to an industrialized modern economy. 
This research, however, without any intention or ambition to scrutinizing every aspect 
in Taiwan’s and mainland China’s economic development from angles of that theory, 
only concentrates on the economic transition part, from agricultural development to 
industrialization, and two social impacts: poverty alleviation and income distribution. 
Therefore, in the subsequent section the research will summarize Mellor’s theory with 
an emphasis on agricultural development in the early stage, in conjunction with the 
industrial sector, deals with poverty and income distribution as a social consequence 
of economic transition. In brief, agricultural-development-led-industrialization and its 
social impacts of poverty reduction and income distribution will form the main 
content of subsequent chapter: agriculture-led economic development. 
This research will not and cannot cover all exogenous and endogenous factors 
when analyzing economic transition in Taiwan and mainland China. In general, this 
research focuses more on endogenous factors in economic transition. Foreign capital 
and international market may obscure the agricultural stimulus for industrial growth, 
including rural market and capital flows, therefore those are the only two exogenous 
factors in a later discussion. Moreover, some macroeconomic elements will not be 
discussed such as inflation rate, price policies for agricultural products, industrial 
policy, and so on. 
 
Land reform played an important role during Taiwan and mainland China’s 
economic transition by arousing peasants’ initiative so as to foster agricultural 
production, yet there is another factor of land reform, of which this thesis will provide 
limited analysis. In Taiwan’s land reform, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) government 
bought land at a low price from landlords and then equally redistributed land among 
                                                             
6  Income distribution appears as one of social impacts of agriculture‐led growth in the chapter of Taiwan case in 
Mellor  ed.  (1995),  though  not  include  in  the  discussion  of  introduction  part.  See  p  8‐10;  53‐55  in Mellor  ed. 
(1995). 
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peasants. In China rural households were equally provided with access to land, with 
those household even signing long-term land using contracts. However, the formal 
ownership was still in the hands of rural collectives. This form of vague property 
rights causes undervalued price and compensation in land expropriation in the process 
of urbanization and industrialization and may bring peasants back to poverty.  
 
  The issue of income distribution of mainland China cannot be more complicated. 
National inequality, intra-rural inequality and intra-urban inequality all have been 
increasing since “Reform and Opening-Up”. Although every single one deserves a 
long article, this research from the approach of economic transition will not take 
certain social-political institutional factors as main study objects, such as the 
urban-rural divide, limitations in migration, social welfare, and socialist’s legacy of 
urban subsidies, because they barely have any direct connections to 
agricultural-development-led industrialization. And the intra-urban inequality of 
mainland China is probably out of concern in later discussion.  
 
2. Agriculture-led Economic Development  
2.1. Concentrating on agriculture  
John Mellor emphasizes agricultural development in early development stages of 
underdeveloped countries, and argues that two features of the agricultural sector make 
it distinct and important in those countries. The first is the size of the agricultural 
sector in underdevelopment countries. The role of food production and an extremely 
low efficiency in agricultural sector demand a majority of the land, labor and other 
resources of the whole country (Mellor, 1966, p 4). Johnston and Mellor (1961) 
estimate that “[t]ypically, some 40 to 60 per cent of the national income is produced in 
agriculture and from 50 to 80 per cent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture 
production” (p 566). Thus the production of the agricultural sector will strongly 
influences the national economy and society. The second characteristic is the secular 
decline in the relative size of the agricultural sector. Mellor explains it as “[t]he faster 
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agriculture grows, the faster its relative size declines” (Mellor, 1996, quote in Mellor, 
1995, p 1). While supplying increasing amount of food and improved diet because of 
the population growth and per capita income that rises with economic growth, the 
agricultural sector is loaded with the burden of transferring capital and labor force to 
nonagricultural sectors (Mellor, 1966, p 4; Johnston and Mellor, 1961, p 567). 
Therefore, agricultural growth is crucial for national food security and nursing 
nonagricultural sectors. 
 
Another cogent reason, provided by Robert Solow and Edward Dennison, that the 
agricultural sector should be emphasized in the early stage, also connects to it massive 
size in underdevelopment countries. Technology change that increases output per unit 
of input in the large scale sector could be easier to “boost national income 
substantially and hasten economic transformation and the shift to the potentially 
faster-growing sectors” than it first begins in smaller nonagricultural sector, because 
the smaller one needs to “proceed at a much higher rate than a given rate in the 
agriculture sector to achieve as much effect on national income” (Mellor, 1995, p 7). 
 
   Johnston and Mellor (1961) summarize five propositions of agriculture’s 
contributions to economic development:   
 
“(1) Economic development is characterized by a substantial increase in the 
demand for agriculture products, and failure to expand food supplies in pace 
with the growth of demand can seriously impede economic growth. (2) 
Expansion of exports of agriculture products may be one of the most 
promising means of increasing income and foreign exchange earnings, 
particularly in the earlier stages of development. (3) The labor force for 
manufacturing and other expanding sectors of the economy must be drawn 
mainly from agriculture. (4) Agriculture, as the dominant sector of an 
underdeveloped economy, can and should make a net contribution to the 
capital required for overhead investment and expansion of secondary industry. 
(5) Rising net cash incomes of the farm population may be important as a 
stimulus to industrial expansion (p 571-572).” 
 
These contributions also provide a solid argument that agricultural development 
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should be promoted in the early stage and will provide substantial support to 
nonagricultural sectors’ development in the subsequent period. 
 
2.2. Poverty and income inequality reduction 
Poverty and income inequality reduction are two important goals in economic 
development. Adelman (1985) argues from the angle of poverty alleviation that the 
agricultural-development-led industrialization strategy is more promising for most 
developing countries than other demand-generating strategies for the following 
reasons:  
 
“1) agriculture is much more labor-intensive than even labor-intensive 
manufacturing; 2) land-augmenting increases in agriculture productivity 
generate increases in demand for the labor of the landless- the poorest of the 
poor; 3) increases in agricultural incomes generate high leakages into 
demand for labor-intensive manufactures on the consumption side and for 
manufactured inputs on the production side; 4) expansion in agricultural 
production is less import-intensive than an equivalent increase in 
manufacturing production; 5) increases in agricultural output with 
‘good-practice’, developing-country technology are less capital-intensive 
than increases in manufacturing; and 6) the agricultural infrastructure 
required to increase agricultural productivity (roads, irrigation, and drainage 
facilities) has a high labor-output ratio (p 60).” 
 
On the extent of the participation of the poor in economic development, the first two 
reasons are directly connected to poverty reduction and narrowing the gap of income 
distribution, while the rest also have implications for increased employment. Since in 
developing countries the number of the poor in rural areas overwhelmingly outstrips 
those in urban area, poverty reduction and narrowing income distribution gap 
basically rely on economic growth in rural areas by creating rural employment. 
 
However, agricultural growth in the way of land augmenting may not effectively 
alleviate poverty if it works alone. One reason is that in some countries with high 
labor to land ratio and a long history of agrarian society, like China, arable land has 
been fully utilized, so the land augment is limited. The other is that “agriculture 
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production, even when it grows rather rapidly, has a limited capacity to absorb rapidly 
increasing quantities of labor in a productive manner” (Mellor, 1995, p 9). Hence, 
whether agricultural growth can improve the condition of the poor is uncertain, but it 
probably depends on the relationship of agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, for 
Mellor (1995) believes that the expansion of rural nonagricultural sectors on the 
extent of employment can lift the poor out of poverty. Thus the relationship between 
agriculture and rural nonagriculture is worth carefully studying especially on its 
implications for employment (ibid., p 9). Moreover, after comparing eight cases of 
agricultural growth and poverty reduction, Mellor combined the argument as: “where 
there has been a marked increase in agricultural production per capita of the total 
population and where nonagricultural growth has occurred rapidly, poverty has 
experienced a rapid decline, as in Taiwan /…/” (ibid., p 320).  
 
As the same reason that probably there is a limit of labor employment in 
agriculture, income gap may be continually narrowed only when industries, especially 
industries in rural areas absorb surplus labor from agriculture. Moreover, comparing 
with agricultural sector, industry is a high-income sector and capable of providing 
high wages, therefore the effort to narrow income distribution from industry is more 
evident than agriculture.  
 
2.3. Conclusion  
To put in a nut shell, agricultural-development-led industrialization stresses on 
agriculture’ development in the early stage of economic development in developing 
countries, not only because that growth of agricultural production can support 
increasing large number of people, but also that the agricultural sector, which is the 
largest one in developing countries, can easily bring economic production to a high 
level by technology change, and even more importantly support industry growth 
through capital and labor flows towards industry, and creating market for industrial 
products. Agriculture, as the biggest labor intensive sector, will improve household 
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income and narrow the urban-rural income gap along with its development. Industries, 
especially rural industries’ expansion can bring more abundant rural labor into 
modern sector which can provide higher wages than agriculture, consequently 
narrowing urban-rural income gap. 
 
3. Economic transitions in Taiwan and China  
Focusing on the take-off period of Taiwan and mainland China, this section is going 
to carry a qualitative research of the two economies based on the discussion of 
previous section. In the agricultural-development-led industrialization framework 
there are three parts that need to be addressed following the sequence of 
industrialization: agricultural development; rural nonagricultural development; and 
the linkages between them. Considering that initial condition played an important role 
in economic development among Asian NIEs, the economic condition of 
pre-development will also be included in discussion. For Taiwan case, the whole 
process has been well analyzed in Mao and Chi (1995), Quibria (2002), and Fei, 
Ranis, and Kuo (1979), therefore Taiwan case in this section will guide the discussion 
and set a sample to analyze the mainland China case. 
 
3.1. Institutions for agricultural development 
This subsection is going to deal with the institutions for agricultural development in 
mainland China before and after 1980s and in Taiwan before and after 1950s from 
three perspectives: human capital; income distribution and wealth; and Physical 
investment.  
 
3.1.1. Human capital  
High literacy rate is a part of Japanese colonial legacy in Taiwan especially in the 
primary level. By 1944, 81 percent of boys and 61 percent of girls of school age were 
enrolled in schools (Booth, 1999, p302). Later the KMT government based on that 
legacy and further extended the enrollment in primary and secondary level. In 1960s, 
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when Taiwan’s industrialization took off and increased with a high rate, more than 
half the population had attained literacy and primary school enrollment’s rate 
achieved nearly 70 percent (Quibria, 2002, p 41).  
 
In mainland China, with the concern about satisfying people’s “basic needs” in the 
socialist era, the China Communist Party (CCP) government had done a nice job of 
providing education to Chinese people on vast regions. Fairly substantial resources 
flowed in to education throughout socialist period even during political campaigns. 
Even though in the Cultural Revolution CCP shut down universities and colleges 
across the country, primary school education significantly spread and illiteracy 
declined rapidly during the same period (Naughton, 2007, p 82). In the 1982 census, 
two thirds of the population was literate and industry skills were widespread across 
the country (ibid., p 82). 
 
3.1.2. Distribution of income and poverty reduction 
Before the land reform Taiwan’s Gini coefficient remained on a relatively high level. 
The Gini coefficient was 0.56 in 1953, but declined in subsequent decades: 0.32 in 
1964 and 0.29 in 1972 (Mao and Chi, 1995, p 54). That was mainly due to the 
changes in land distribution. Before 1945, the poorest 40 percent of household owned 
less than 10 percent of the land, but the wealthiest 2 percent hold more than one third 
of land. Furthermore, about 40 percent of the households were landless tenant 
households, who worked almost 60 percent of total cultivated land (Fei, Ranis, and 
Kuo, 1979, p 23). After the land reform launched by KMT government, household 
owing medium plots land, from 0.5 to 3 chia7
 
, increased from 46 percent in 1952 to 
76 percent in 1960. From 1948 to 1959, the proportion of land cultivated by tenants 
decreased from 44 percent to 17 percent, and proportion of tenant farmers in farm 
families reduced from 38 percent in 1950 to 15 percent in 1960 (ibid., p 42). 
Mainland China had an even more favorable initial condition of income distribution 
                                                             
7  One chia equals to 0.97 hectare or 2.47 acres.   
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than Taiwan. Although China is a large and developing country with great diversities 
of nature endowments, yet under the socialist economy Chinese society was dualistic 
but egalitarian. The early rural reform even narrowed the rural-urban gap and made 
China less dualistic but still high egalitarian (Naughton, 2007, p 217). In China’s rural 
reforms between 1978 and 1984, every rural collective divided its land according to 
the number of labors and the number of members to feed in a household. Although the 
formal property right remains in collectives, households have accesses to work on 
land and the land-use rights can be extended up to 50 years. This reform, as Walder 
(2000) saying, was: “the most egalitarian land reform in history” (Naughton, 2007, p 
120), resulted in little landlessness in rural China, and “there is little of the crushing 
poverty caused by absolute landlessness found in many development economies” 
(ibid. p120). Around 1982 to 1984 China reached the lowest point of Gini 
Coefficients, with less than 0.25 for rural area, around 0.16 for urban area and less 
than 0.30 for national Gini coefficients (ibid., Figure 9.2, p 218). 
 
3.1.3. Physical investment  
Taiwan was deliberately built as an important food supplier for Japan, therefore under 
Japan’s 50 years of occupation, agriculture accounted for half of Taiwan’s GNP and 
the biggest labor employer. Before the 1920s the growth rate of agricultural 
production was about 2 percent annually, contributed by expansion of cultivated land 
area which expanded from 519,000 hectares in 1910, to 752,800 hectares in 1921, and 
reached 837,000 hectares in 1942. Over the 1920s and 1930s irrigated land area rose 
from 364,100 hectares to 528,000 hectares, and 545,000 hectares in 1942, meanwhile 
the irrigated portion of cultivated land increased from 48.4 to 61.6 percent (Mao and 
Chi, 1995, p 25; Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 1979, p 22). In order to facilitate the 
transportation of rural production, the Japanese undertook various projects to build an 
efficient and inexpensive system of railroad and rural roads. During those years 
improved varieties of crops and the use of chemical fertilizers were also introduced 
into production and significantly raised crop yields. The Japanese also set up farmers’ 
associations and rural credit cooperative so as to provide advice on modern 
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agricultural practices and assistance for agricultural finance. The farmer’s associations 
still remained as one of the most important rural organizations in agricultural 
development after 1945.  
 
Since the 1950s China’s agricultural growth greatly benefited from the green 
revolution. In Figure 3.1, irrigation area rose from more than 19 million hectares in 
1952 to more than 44 million hectares in the late 1970s, and later the number leveled 
off throughout 1980s, but kept climbing up in the 1990s and finally exceed 55 million 
hectares in 2005. Organic fertilizers were widely used in the traditional agriculture 
input system and it’s capable to provide sufficient nutrients, hence chemical fertilizer 
consumption was almost stagnant during the 1950s, with 78,000 tons in 1952, slowly 
increasing in the 1960s and 1970s, and finally reached almost 8,840,000 tons in 1978. 
The consumption grew vigorously from the 1980s and it reached more than 51 million 
tons in 2007 (See Figure 3.2). China spared no effort in agricultural research ever 
since the 1950s when China government built the world largest multilevel research 
system. Cooperating with provincial level academies and agricultural extension 
service in counties, the Chinese Academy of Agriculture Sciences (CAAS) undertook 
the jobs of seed promotion, production, distribution and adaptation. The whole system 
kept working and progressing even during the Culture Revolution. Two greatest 
experience before the 1980s were development of high-yielding dwarf variety of rice 
in 1964, and introduction and extension of hybrid varieties of various crops 
(Naughton, 2007, p 261- 262). 
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Figure 3.1: Change of total irrigated areas in mainland China, 1949-2007 
Sources: Data from 1949 to 1989 comes from “Production Condition for Agriculture of China” in 
National Statistics category of China Data Online; Data from 1990 to 2007 refers to NBSC (2008).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Changes of chemical fertilizer consumptions in mainland China, 
1949-2007 
Source: “Production Condition for Agriculture of China” in National Statistics category of China 
Data Online. 
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3.2. Agricultural growth 
The period from 1946 to 1950 was Taiwan’s recovery and rehabilitation time with a 
high annual growth rate of 19.2 percent in agricultural production. However, the 
growth rate declined sharply to 6.2 percent from 1950 to 1955 and further dropped to 
below 3 percent in the early 1970s and the whole 1980s. The growth rate of total 
agricultural production grew 4.3 percent annually from 1950 to 1988 which makes 
Taiwan a successful economy of agricultural production (Mao and Chi, 1995, p 27). 
Meanwhile, other items of agricultural production, including livestock, fisheries, and 
forestry, grew even more strikingly and their share in total production extended, 
except forestry of which production started to decrease in late 1960s (ibid., Table 2.1, 
p 27).  
 
  In mainland China the agricultural production growth evidently accelerated after 
the “Reform and Opening-up”. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 collected data of gross output 
of main agricultural products and indices of every five years in mainland China from 
1978 to 2008. The grain production in 1978 was about 305 million tons which was 
only 57.67 percent of about 528 million tons in 2008, and contrasted to the peak 
before 1978 of 300 million tons per year (Naughton, 2007, p 253). As in Taiwan case, 
the achievements of other main agricultural products including cotton, oil-bearing 
crops, sugar, meat and aquatic products were even more impressive. Total productions 
of cotton, oil-bearing crops, sugar, meat and aquatic products in 1978 were, 
respectively, only 28.89 percent, 17.69 percent, 18.32 percent, 14.628
 
 percent, and 
9.51 percent of the ones in 2008. Figure 3.3 shows that the annual growth rates 
floundered after 1978, however, they were all above 3 percent, expect in 1980. The 
average annual growth rate from 1978 to 2007 is 6.16 percent, which is higher than 
Taiwan’s from 1950 to 1988. 
 
                                                             
8  Data in 1979. 
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Source: “Output of major farm crops of China” in National Statistics category in China Data 
Online; NBSC (1990 and 2008) 
Note:*data of 1979; **data of 2007 
 
Table 3.2: Indices of main agricultural products in mainland China, 1978-2008 
(index, 2008=100) 
Years Grain Cotton Oil 
bearing 
crops 
Sugar Meat Aquatic 
products 
Total 
gross 
output 
  1978 57.67 28.89 17.69 18.32 14.62* 9.51 2.86 
  1983 73.28 61.83 35.76 31.02 19.29 11.15 5.62 
  1988 74.57 55.32 44.76 47.60 34.11 21.67 12.00 
  1993 86.37 49.86 61.15 58.65 52.85 37.24 22.49 
  1998 96.93 60.01 78.44 75.31 78.74 69.10 50.20 
  2003 81.49 64.80 95.29 74.17 88.64 83.29 60.73 
2008 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00** 
Source: “Output of major farm crops of China” in National Statistics category in China Data 
Online; NBSC (1990 and 2008) 
Note:*data of 1979; **data of 2007 
 
Table 3.1: Gross output of main agricultural products in mainland China, 
1978-2008 (current prices) 
Year Grain 
(10000 tons) 
Cotton 
Crops 
(10000 
tons) 
Oil-Bearing 
Crops (10000 
tons) 
Sugar 
(10000 
tons) 
Output of 
Meat 
(10000 
tons) 
Total 
Aquatic 
Products 
(10000 tons) 
Total Gross  
Output (100 
million Yuan) 
  1978 30,476.50 216.7 521.79 2,381.80 1,062.4* 465.35 1,397.00 
  1983 38,728.00 463.7 1,055.00 4,032.30 1,402.10 546 2,750.00 
  1988 39,408.00 414.9 1,320.30 6,187.40 2,479.50 1,060.90 5,865.30 
  1993 45,648.80 373.93 1,803.94 7,624.20 3,841.50 1,823.00 10,995.50 
  1998 51,229.53 450.1 2,313.86 9,790.40 5,723.80 3,382.66 24,541.90 
  2003 43,069.53 485.97 2,811.00 9,641.70 6,443.32 4,077.02 29,691.80 
  2008 52,850.00 750 2,950.00 13,000.00 7,269.00 4,895.00 48,893.00** 
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Figure 3.3: Indices of gross output of agriculture in mainland China, 1978-2007 
(valued by constant price9
Source: NBSC (1991and 2008) 
, preceding year=100) 
 
3.3. The rise of rural industries  
The small, labor-intensive and indigenous firm which started at the very beginning of 
takeoff period in rural areas was a common feature in rural industrialization of Taiwan 
and China (Lin and Yang, 2001, p 180). The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
and the rural industries, or the Township and village enterprises (TVEs), both played 
important roles in economic transition of Taiwan and mainland China.  
 
The SMEs in Taiwan, defined as fewer than 100 employees firms, were the 
absolutely majority among manufacturing firms from the 1950s to 1980s. At the 
beginning nearly all, above 99 percent, manufacturing firms were SMEs. The number 
                                                             
9  Indexes in Figure 3.3 are comparable prices, valued by constant prices to eliminate the effects of price changes. 
There are three constant prices in this figure from 1978 to 2007. Prices from 1978 to 1981 were valued by 1970 
price; from 1981 to 1991 were valued by 1980 price; and after 1991 were valued by 1990 price (NBSC, 2002b).   
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of SMEs slightly declined from 99.4 percent in 1954 to more than 95 percent in the 
1970s and 1980s. The average size of SMEs increased from 8.4 persons in 1961 to 
21.3 persons in 1966 and then dropped from the peak of 28.2 persons in 1971 to 
above 24 persons in the 1980s. Labors in SMEs accounted 61percent of total 
manufacturing employment in 1961 and continuingly declined with average size of 
firms in the mid 1970s, but steadily rose again in the 1980s (Mao and Chi, 1995, 
Table 2.6, p 44). Benefited from export promoted policies, SMEs absorbed Taiwan’s 
abundant labor, made use of simple technologies, and easily entered various industrial 
sectors due to their small size. The share of SMEs in total manufacture production 
increased from 27 percent in 1971 to 48 percent in 1984. The percentage of total 
export values grew from 55.7 percent in 1972 to 66.7 percent in 1980, and 75.9 
percent in 1982 to 71.8 percent in 1984 (ibid., p 45).  
 
Traditional China’s rural economy was featured for prosperous small-scale, 
nonagricultural activities, which created a web for agricultural production and 
processing. However, that linkage was crushed by command economy and caused 
income decline especially in commercialized rural areas, where the agricultural land 
per capita was low. TVEs first appeared as a response during the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF). Communes were encouraged to run factories, construction team and all kinds 
of nonagricultural undertakings. In the Cultural Revolution era, rural industrialization 
revived rapidly with the assist from state support under the guideline of new leap 
forward. In the 1970s rural industries expended from “serve agriculture” to several 
capital-intensive industries: the “Five Small Industries” which consisted of iron and 
steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, hydroelectric power and farm implements.  
 
Although rural industries were important in rural economy before 1978: they 
absorbed surplus labor in rural area, increased household income; and their revenue 
was channeled to supporting agricultural development and public works, yet the 
development of rural industries was bounded in the structure of command economy, 
badly influenced by center policies. Hence, as a consequence, their connections with 
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agriculture were weak, and their functions and roles in rural development were 
restricted10
 
.  
After 1978 rural enterprises entered a golden era of development. Except TVEs11, 
or precisely collective-owned firms, private enterprises and self-employed individuals 
also expanded rapidly. Figure 3.4 provides us an overview of the nonagricultural 
employment in mainland China’s rural area from 1985 to 2002. The total number of 
employment increased from 69 million in 1985 to a peak of about 135 million in 1996. 
However the golden age ended in the mid 1990s, employment declined and stagnated 
until the early 2000s. This figure also indicates an evident decline of employment in 
collective-owned firms but a significant extension in private firms and self-employed 
individuals after 1997 until 200212. This transition can be explained that the favorable 
policy ambiance for collective-owned firms ceased to exist and a widespread 
privatization initialed among those firms13
                                                             
10  Discussions in these two paragraphs are based on part 12.1 in Naughton (2007). 
. Table 3.3 tells a similar outline. The total 
number of rural enterprises increased from 1.52 million in 1978 to 21.33 million in 
2002, but the peak was 24.94 million in 1994. The share of number of employees 
hired by rural enterprises in total rural labor force grew from 9.2 percent in 1978 to a 
crest of 29.8 percent in 1996, and then declined, but leveled off around 27 percent 
later. The industrial output of rural enterprises accounted for only 9.1 percent in 1978, 
however, this share reached 57.9 percent in 1997. And the share of rural enterprise 
export in total exports dramatically increased from 9.19 percent in 1986 to 45.81 
percent in 1997 (Lin and Yang, 2001, Table 4.1, 4.2, p 146-147).  
11  The identifications of TVEs (xiangzhen qiye) varied in the last 30 years. At first TVEs referred to only collective 
and  brigade  owned  enterprises.  This  definition was  framed  in  the  industry  system  of  ownership:  state‐owned 
(guoyou), collective‐owned (jiti suoyou) and private‐owned (siyou) enterprises.  In early years the private‐owned 
enterprises were not approved and in some cases they were covered by local government as a part of collectives. 
The private‐owned enterprises were not included in the calculation of nonagriculture sectors until 1985. Later the 
“TVEs”  acquired  a  broader  extension,  and  in  many  documents  it  covered  both  collective‐owned  and 
private‐owned  enterprises.  The  private‐owned  enterprises  (siyou  qiye)  can  be  divided  in  to  private  enterprises 
(siyin  qiye)  and  self‐employed  individuals  (geti  hu).  Private  enterprise  (siyin  qiye)  is  bigger  than  self‐employed 
individual  in  scale  (more  than  8  people)  moreover  there  exists  the  employer‐employee  relationship  in  those 
enterprises. 
12  Based  on  different  sources  of  data, Naughton  (2007)  found  the  decline  of  employment  in  collective‐owned 
firms and the increase in private and self employed firms are sustained until 2004 (Figure 12.2, p 286). 
13  See p285‐293 in Naughton (2007). 
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However, the end of golden age implied no indication of retrogression among rural 
enterprises but a modest growth rate closer to GDP growth rate. TVE value added as a 
share of GDP increased from 26 percent in 1996 to 30 percent in 1999 and sustained 
at the same level through 2004 (Naughton, 2007, p 286). Moreover, Naughton 
presumed that rural enterprises succeeded in raising labor efficiency thus they could 
promote their production without adding workers (ibid., p 286).  
! " # $ % & ' ( —— ) * + $ , - . / 0 1 2 3
 
Figure 3.4: Nonagricultural employments in rural China, 1985-2002  
Source: NBSC (1991 and 2003) 
 
Table 3.3: Employment and number of rural enterprises, 1978-2002 
years number of firms  
(millions) 
Employment 
(millions) 
percent of total rural labor 
% 
1978 1.52 28.27 9.2 
1979 1.48 29.09 9.4 
1980 1.42 30 9.4 
1981 1.34 29.7 9.1 
1982 1.36 31.13 9.2 
1983 1.35 32.34 9.3 
1984 6.07 52.08 14.5 
1985 12.22 69.79 18.8 
1986 15.15 79.37 20.9 
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1987 17.5 88.05 22.6 
1988 18.88 95.45 23.8 
1989 18.69 93.67 22.9 
1990 18.73 92.65 22.1 
1991 19.09 96.09 22.3 
1992 20.92 106.25 24.2 
1993 24.53 123.45 27.9 
1994 24.94 120.17 26.9 
1995 22.03 128.62 28.6 
1996 23.36 135.08 29.8 
1997 20.15 130.50 28.4 
1998 20.04 125.37 27.0 
1999 20.71 127.04 27.1 
2000 20.85 128.20 26.7 
2001 21.16 130.86 27.1 
2002 21.33 132.88 27.4 
Source: NBSC (2000 and 2003); NBSC and MLSS (1999).  
Note: Data for 1978-1983 only include township and village level enterprises. 
 
3.4. Linkages within economic transition 
Section 3.3 has described the labor transition from agricultural sector to rural 
enterprises. Agricultural sector supports rural enterprises by transforming surplus 
labor to indigenous and labor-intensive rural factories. This section is going to widen 
the discussion of labor transition to the whole economy, for the reason that a large 
number of surplus rural labors migrated to urban area and provided cheap labor to the 
booming second and tertiary industries.   
 
The labor flows from agricultural to nonagricultural sectors in Taiwan can be 
divided into two periods. From 1952 to 1964 agriculture still absorbed large amount 
of increased labor. Agricultural labor increased from 1.64 million to 1.81 million, but 
the growth rate was lower than that of total labor force. During the same period more 
than 200,000 agricultural workers transferred to nonagricultural sectors, at an average 
of 19, 000 a year, and the growth rate ranging from 0.3 to 2.3 percent. The labor 
transferring accelerated after 1965 because of the rapid industrialization in 
nonagricultural sector. From 1965 to 1973 labor migrated from agriculture to 
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nonagriculture at an average of 93,522 persons per year (Mao and Chi, 1995, p 49). 
 
   The mainland China case also clearly shows the trends of general labor flows. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates that from 1978 to 2007 the percentage of employment in 
agricultural sector decreased steadily from 70 to 40 percent, and during the same 
period nonagricultural employment kept rising up to about 60 percent.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Change of employment in Mainland China, 1978-2007 
Source: NBSC (2008) 
 
The capital flow from agricultural to nonagricultural sectors is another argument in 
agricultural-development-led industrialization. It’s not easy to estimate, however it’s 
rational to argue that nonagricultural sectors’ development was benefited from 
domestic savings originated from agricultural development. In Taiwan, SMEs’ growth 
was not supported by government so they could hardly gain any low-cost loans 
together with other resources from government. What they relied on was the informal 
money market which consisted of domestic savings. In mainland China however, due 
to the political and historical reasons the capital flowing from agricultural sector to 
nonagricultural sectors was propelled by local governments. Rural industries received 
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capital from agricultural revenues through collectives at the beginning. When rural 
industries extended in 1980s, the rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) were allowed to 
lend more local deposits to rural industries, though the RCCs were designed to 
transfer rural domestic savings to urban areas. What makes mainland China different 
from Taiwan was that local governments were willing to act as intermediaries and 
guarantors for rural industries, mainly collective-owned TVEs, to ensured bank 
capitals and even gave pressure upon local branches of banking system to provide 
loans to their firms. Hence rural firms had enough money to extend their scales and 
newly founded firms can enter business with a larger size, and to start with some 
mechanization (Naughton, 2007, p 278-279).  
 
Figure 3.6 shows changes of expenditure to support agriculture and social subsidies 
in total operation revenue of rural industries in mainland China from 1978 to 2007. 
Although it is an incomplete estimation of rural industries efforts to support 
agriculture, the figure can prove that in mainland China rural industries did support 
agricultural development in the way of capital flow. This expenditure kept rising up 
from below 5 billion to more than 25 billion in 1996 and then continued declining 
until 2002. It shows that the total amount of expenditure was greatly influenced by the 
performance of rural enterprises and the decline happened when the golden age of 
TVEs ended (See section 3.3.).  
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Figure 3.6: Expenditure for supporting agriculture and social subsidies from 
total operation revenue of rural industries in mainland China, 1978-2002 
Source: NBSC (2003) 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
So far this section has finished the comparing of Taiwan and mainland China based on 
the discussion of agricultural-development-led industrialization in section 2. Both 
economies’ development benefited from several institutions especially in the initial 
stage: human capital, distribution of income and poverty reduction, and physical 
investment. Either colonial age or socialist era in Taiwan and China provided larger 
number of educated people for economic growth than some less developed countries. 
Societies in those two economies were egalitarian and income gaps were small at least 
in the early stage of economic transition. Land reforms in Taiwan and mainland China 
not only stimulated agricultural production, but also significantly reduced social 
poverty and improved income distribution. Taiwan and mainland China both had well 
developed infrastructure foundation for agricultural production, such as paved roads, 
irrigation, and extended cultivated land. Moreover, green revolution spread all over 
the two economies ever since the colonial or socialist’s ages. New productive seeds 
and agricultural chemicals were widely adopted so as to increase production. Farmer 
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associations in Taiwan, CAAS and rural collectives in mainland China were adopted 
to organize agricultural production and promote the green revolution. To sum up, 
mainland China, at the beginning of reform and opening up, shared all the same 
favorable factors for economic development as Taiwan in the takeoff age. 
 
The subsequent two subsections elaborated the growth of agricultural and rural 
nonagricultural sectors. Agricultural productions increased evidently in Taiwan and 
mainland China throughout economic transitions and at the same time rural industries 
expended and grew in a more remarkable speed and acted an increasingly important 
role in the whole economy. Therefore, there existed a correlation of agricultural 
development and rural industries growth not only in Taiwan but also in mainland 
China. The fourth subsection found certain causal linkages between agricultural and 
rural industrial growth. Large number of former agricultural labors transferred to 
nonagriculture sectors in both economies, and rural industries received a large number 
of domestic savings from agriculture growth. Because of substantial supports from 
local government, rural firms in mainland China enjoyed even better environment for 
development. Later in mainland China case, findings revealed an outflow of capital 
from rural industries to support agricultural growth since 1978. 
 
All in all, by comparing Taiwan and mainland China’s economic growth, this 
section reaches a conclusion that mainland China’s economic transition can’t be more 
similar to the Taiwan model of agricultural-development-led industrialization. 
However, the closer mainland China’s and Taiwan’s economic transitions grow, the 
more delusive of mainland China’s worsen income distribution become. 
 
4. Provincial analysis  
Last section has proved that mainland China is also an agricultural-development-led 
industrialization just as Taiwan; however the former failed to accomplish the social 
aim of income distribution improvement. So far in this thesis the puzzle that Gini 
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coefficient especially the rural one rose steadily in mainland China which counters the 
case of Taiwan hasn’t been solved. Moreover the findings in last section make it even 
more complicated and confusing: broad commonalities in industrialization processes 
existed between mainland China and Taiwan. Nevertheless, this puzzle doesn’t so 
much originate from previous findings as from a possible presumption of a universal 
mainland China case. On one hand the national data can tell us the mainstream or 
general pattern of China’s economic transition, which was proved to be 
agricultural-development-led industrialization, on the other, might disguise the 
possible regional patterns of economic transition which may result in the increasing 
inequality in China. Therefore the hypothesis is that sub models or patterns exist 
among provinces because of vast diversities of nature endowment and foundations for 
economic development. Hence, in order to find a clue of the failure in income 
distribution improvement, this section will try to test the hypothesis and provide an 
explanation of agricultural and rural industries’ development in mainland China 
through provincial analysis. 
 
4.1. Different paces of industrialization  
Table 4.1 presents percentages of agriculture and nonagriculture in total output of 
rural economy in 1981 and 1990, and ranks the 30 provinces14
                                                             
14  Hainan  province  was  a  part  of  Guangdong  province  before  1988,  hence  in  1981  there’re  29  provinces. 
Chongqing city was a newly founded municipality in 1997. Please refer to the map of China in appendix. 
 in mainland China by 
the change of percentage of nonagricultural output. The percentage of total 
nonagricultural output to total rural output was only 14.33 percent in 1981 however it 
rose by 39.57 percent and reached 53.9 percent in 1990. At the same time the 
percentage of total agricultural output to total rural output decreased from 85.67 to 
46.1 percent. Although the percentage of nonagricultural output of national level 
increased by 39.57 percent, the provincial changes ranged from 51.74 percent in 
Shandong province to -1.23 percent of Tibet autonomous region. Table 4.1 has 
divided all the provinces into two groups through the change scale of 39.57 percent. 
Eight provinces’ changes exceed the national level: Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
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Beijing, Liaoning, Hebei, Shanghai and Guangdong. Meanwhile, their percentage of 
nonagricultural output in 1990 was much higher than most of the second group 
provinces, expect Tianjin and Shanxi, of which the percentages of nonagricultural 
output were higher both in 1981 and 1990 than most provinces though their increase 
wasn’t distinct.  
 
Therefore, Table 4.1 at least proved that the economic transitions among province 
were asynchronous. Ten provinces with higher percentage of nonagricultural output: 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Hebei, Guangdong, Liaoning, Shanxi 
and Zhejiang coexisted with quite a few provinces with lower portion, below national 
level of 53.9%, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guizhou, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia 
in the west, and Hubei, Anhui in the middle, as well as Jilin, Fujian in the east, etc. 
Moreover, Table 4.1 does provide evidences that big municipalities and several 
coastal provinces, which had larger increase of nonagricultural output percentage and 
higher nonagricultural output percentage, were probably leading the industrialization 
of rural China while most of the provinces in middle and west China were left far 
behind.  
 
Table 4.1: Percentage of agriculture and nonagriculture in total output of rural 
economy, 1981 and 1990 (%) 
Provinces Agricultural output  Nonagricultural output Change 
 
 1981 1990 1981 1990 1981-1990 
Shandong 88.32 36.58 11.68 63.42 51.74 
Jiangsu 75.97 28.01 24.03 71.99 47.96 
Zhejiang 77.34 29.56 22.66 70.44 47.78 
Beijing 70.49 25.19 29.51 74.81 45.3 
Liaoning 84.19 38.89 15.81 61.11 45.3 
Hebei 82.04 40.97 17.96 59.03 41.07 
Shanghai 58.33 17.35 41.67 82.65 40.98 
Guangdong 86.9 46.06 13.1 53.94 40.84 
      
National level 85.67 46.1 14.33 53.9 39.57 
      
Henan 86.72 48.81 13.28 51.19 37.91 
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Shaanxi 89.61 53.15 10.39 46.85 36.46 
Hubei 91.97 57.39 8.03 42.61 34.58 
Shanxi 73.24 38.71 26.76 61.29 34.53 
Anhui 92.53 58.13 7.47 41.87 34.4 
Sichuan 93.15 59.6 6.85 40.4 33.55 
Gansu 92.93 60.72 7.07 39.28 32.21 
Fujian 82.4 50.53 17.6 49.47 31.87 
Hunan 89.97 61.35 10.03 38.65 28.62 
Jilin 86.89 58.69 13.11 41.31 28.2 
Heilongjiang 90.89 63.64 9.11 36.36 27.25 
Ningxia 92.05 68.95 7.95 31.05 23.1 
Jiangxi 84.58 62.26 15.42 37.74 22.32 
Tianjin 41.52 19.81 58.48 80.19 21.71 
Yunnan 90.37 74.95 9.63 25.05 15.42 
Hainan         ---* 85.95      ---* 14.05 14.05 
Qinghai 93.74 80.22 6.26 19.78 13.52 
Guizhou 87.79 74.99 12.21 25.01 12.8 
Inner Mongolia 89.81 77.03 10.19 22.97 12.78 
Guangxi 88.43 76.49 11.57 23.51 11.94 
Xinjiang 93.4 86.72 6.6 13.28 6.68 
Tibet 92.31 93.54 7.69 6.46 -1.23 
Source: NBSC (1981 and 1991) 
Note: *data are not available.  
 
4.2. Regional patterns 
Table 4.2 calculated index of nonagricultural and agricultural output per capita in 
1981, 1990 and 1995. Higher indexes indicate better performance in either 
agricultural sector or nonagricultural sectors and vice versa. And if the index is more 
than one, then the performance exceeds national level. Based on the data from Table 
4.2, Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 revealed that there were positive correlations between 
indexes of nonagricultural and agricultural output per capita in all the three years, 
moreover from 1981 to 1995 these correlations became stronger15
                                                             
15  R square in 1995 is lower than the one in 1990, but it will increase to 0.4032 if Xinjiang is excluded as an outlier. 
If Hainan, another outlier, is excluded, then the R square in 1995 will reach 0.5419, which shows a relatively 
strong relationship. 
. In another way of 
saying, from 1981 to 1995 province which held a higher nonagricultural output per 
capita was more likely to maintain a higher agricultural output per capita, vice versa. 
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This finding somehow might show us a clue that among the provinces there was a 
close connection between agricultural and nonagricultural production: the better 
agricultural performs the better nonagricultural sectors develop, vice versa.  
 
Furthermore, the strengthening correlations in from 1981 to 1991 and 1995 might 
result from the relief of command economy and center policies. Rural nonagricultural 
sectors finally got the chance to choose a development road in favor of their 
comparative advantages of abundant labor and built a closer connection to agricultural 
sector. Those findings are not surprising since they testified again the conclusion in 
section 3 that in national wide mainland China was on the road of 
agricultural-development-led industrialization and the development in agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors was closely knitted. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Indices of nonagricultural and agricultural output per capita in 
provinces, 1981, 1990 and 1995 (National level=1) 
Provinces Nonagricultural output per 
capita  
Agricultural output per 
capita 
1981 1990 1995 1981 1990 1995 
Beijing 3.48 4.79 2.01 1.39 1.88 2.00 
Tianjin 7.45 5.62 3.66 0.88 1.62 1.52 
Hebei 1.11 1.00 0.93 0.85 0.81 0.97 
Shanxi 1.71 0.88 0.82 0.78 0.65 0.59 
Inner 
Mongolia 
0.75 0.33 0.59 1.11 1.29 1.18 
Liaoning 1.47 1.88 1.98 1.31 1.40 1.54 
Jilin 1.24 0.88 0.60 1.37 1.46 1.54 
Heilongjiang 0.97 0.71 0.68 1.62 1.45 1.64 
Shanghai 7.26 7.01 5.15 1.70 1.72 2.10 
Jiangsu 2.45 2.78 2.22 1.30 1.26 1.43 
Zhejiang 2.00 2.36 2.77 1.14 1.16 1.12 
Anhui 0.50 0.56 0.81 1.04 0.90 0.89 
Fujian 1.17 0.91 1.31 0.92 1.09 1.31 
Jiangxi 1.05 0.50 0.87 0.96 0.97 0.89 
Shandong 0.88 1.57 1.72 1.12 1.06 1.18 
Henan 0.82 0.71 0.58 0.90 0.79 0.76 
Hubei 0.58 0.69 1.00 1.11 1.08 1.10 
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Hunan 0.70 0.48 0.59 1.06 0.90 0.89 
Guangdong 0.79 1.45 1.14 0.88 1.45 1.16 
Guangxi 0.65 0.21 0.34 0.83 0.81 0.86 
Sichuan 0.38 0.48 0.73 0.86 0.82 0.73 
Guizhou 0.50 0.17 0.08 0.60 0.60 0.53 
Yunnan 0.50 0.22 0.20 0.78 0.77 0.64 
Tibet 0.74 0.07 ---* 1.47 1.12 0.80 
Shaanxi 0.54 0.57 0.35 0.78 0.75 0.63 
Gansu 0.30 0.35 0.29 0.66 0.63 0.67 
Qinghai 0.42 0.19 0.07 1.04 0.92 0.77 
Ningxia 0.48 0.33 0.11 0.93 0.86 0.70 
Xinjiang 0.58 0.21 0.17 1.37 1.58 2.16 
Hainan      ---** 0.22 0.32      ---** 1.54 1.91 
National level 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: NBSC (1981, 1991 and 1996) 
Note: * Data for Tibet is not available after 1992 in China statistical yearbook; ** Data are not 
available for Hainan. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Provincial correlation of agricultural and nonagricultural output per 
capita (1981) 
Source: NBSC (1981) 
y = 0.0552x + 0.9809
R² = 0.1229
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
In
de
x 
of
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 o
ut
pu
t p
er
 c
ap
it
a
Index of Nonagriculture output per capita
 35 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Provincial correlation of agricultural and nonagricultural output per 
capita (1990) 
Source: NBSC (1991) 
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Figure 4.3: Provincial correlation of agricultural and nonagricultural output per 
capita (1995) 
Source: NBSC (1996)  
Note: Tibet is not included in Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 set index of agricultural output per capita as Y coordinate 
axis and index of nonagricultural output per capita as X coordinate axis. The national 
level value is selected as the origin of coordinates. There are four quadrants in these 
coordinates, and from one to four respectively represents: 1) high agricultural and non 
agricultural output per capita index group; 2) high agricultural but low nonagricultural 
output per capita index group; 3) low agricultural and non agricultural output per 
capita index group; and 4) low agricultural but high nonagricultural output per capita 
index group. As mentioned above the indexes can suggest performance in both 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Higher indexes indicate a better performance 
in either agricultural sector or nonagricultural sectors thus for example the first 
quadrant equals to group with better agricultural and nonagricultural performances.  
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of provinces by indexes, 1981 
                 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of provinces by indexes, 1990 
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Index of agricultural output per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of provinces by indexes, 1995 
Note: Tibet is not included in figure 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
Based on the analysis above, there are three groups among mainland China’s 29 
provinces, if we prefer data in 1995: 1) high agricultural and nonagricultural output 
per capita index group, including Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, 
Shandong and so on; 2) high agricultural but low nonagricultural output per capita 
index group, including Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Xinjiang, and so on; 3) low 
agricultural and nonagricultural output per capita index group, including Hebei, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Sichuan, etc. Group 1 contained all the municipalities in 1995 and 
several coastal provinces; however group 2 and 3 mainly consisted of middle and 
western provinces. There was a forth group of low agricultural but high 
nonagricultural output per capita in 1981 and 1990, but it vanished in 1995 case.  
 
Until now the thesis has not only proved that economic transitions among mainland 
China’s provinces took different steps and far from a universal pattern, but also 
established sub-patterns among provinces. Provinces in group 1 resembled Taiwan’s 
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agricultural-development-led industrialization. Those provinces had higher 
agricultural and nonagricultural output per capita, which also means better 
agricultural and nonagricultural performance than other provinces, and they were 
founded as economic centers, leading the development of the whole economy. 
Provinces in group 2 and 3 were largely left behind, though most of them have paid 
great efforts to agricultural and rural industrial development. However, their economy, 
especially rural industries, didn’t perform as well as provinces in group 1. Provinces 
in group 2 and 3 like Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, Anhui, etc, which has a large number of 
surplus labor, become suppliers of migrant workers to economic centers built in group 
1. 
 
4.3. Mainland China’s economic transition  
4.3.1. Trends in mainland China’s economic transition 
There are two evident general trends by comparing those three figures: 1) a large 
decline of province number in the fourth quadrant; and 2) an increase of total number 
of provinces in the first and third quadrants. The number of provinces in the fourth 
quadrant (low agricultural but high nonagricultural performance) dropped from 5 in 
1980 to 1 in 1990 and 0 in 1995, meanwhile the total number in quadrant 1 and 3 
increased from 15 in 1981 to 22 in 1990 and 23 in 1995. Since any increase of 
province numbers in the first and third quadrants will strengthen the correlation of 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors but the increase in the second and fourth 
quadrants will weaken the correlation, these two changes indicate that the correlation 
of agricultural and nonagricultural development was strengthened from 1981 to 1991 
and 1995.  
 
Moreover, the first trend may also suggest that a growth of higher nonagricultural 
performance but lower agricultural performance wasn’t sustainable. And the higher 
number of provinces in 1981 of the fourth quadrant can be explained by policy as 
exogenous factor which fostered rural industries development. As described in section 
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3.3, both centre and local governments encouraged rural enterprise growth by 
providing them with access to fund and land. Furthermore the command economy 
made their disadvantage of outdated technology abated. Hence, those provinces could 
acquire a better performance of nonagricultural sectors even if their agricultural 
sectors were weaker than other ones in early years of economic growth. 
 
  Yet the shift of five provinces in the fourth quadrant to other ones was a miserable 
experience. Three of the five provinces, Hebei, Shanxi and Jiangxi, which are all 
inland provinces, moved to the third quadrant of low agricultural and nonagricultural 
output per capita, and they stayed there in 1990 and 1995. Only Fujian and Tianjin got 
spared. Fujian, a coastal province closest to Taiwan moved to the second quadrant of 
high agricultural but low nonagricultural output per capita index. Meanwhile, Tianjin, 
a municipality bordered on Beijing, directly joined the first quadrant provinces of 
high agricultural and nonagricultural performance.  
 
  There were three provinces succeeded in entering the first quadrant expect Tianjin: 
Shandong, Fujian and Guangdong. Shandong and Fujian shifted to the first quadrant 
after they had a better agricultural performance or precisely higher agricultural output 
per capita. This finding most likely suggests that those two provinces’ development 
followed the agricultural-development-led industrialization. As discussed in section 3, 
higher agricultural output per capita index can promise transfer of higher savings, 
surplus labour for the reason that agricultural sector is capable of undertaking its job 
of feed increasing number of population in a smaller scale, and larger indigenous 
market are available because higher GDP per capita also implies higher household 
income. Thus to reach the second quadrant may be the first step of entering the first 
one, namely, agricultural development should come first in economic transition if we 
want to reach a better performance of both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 
 
It seems that Guangdong province shift directly from the third quadrant to the first 
one in 1990. In order to eliminate the possibility that Guangdong might have moved 
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to the second quadrant before it reached the first quadrant as Fujian and Shandong, 
data in earlier years, before 1990, have been processed. The result is that Guangdong 
entered the first quadrant in 1985, but it remained in the third quadrant of both low 
agricultural and nonagricultural performance until 1984. In 1983 index for 
agricultural and nonagricultural output per capita respectively was 0.87 and 0.75, 
which means an increase of 0.08 in agricultural output per capita index but a decrease 
of 0.13 in nonagricultural output per capita index compared with 1981 index, and the 
indexes later declined to an even lower level of 0.80 and 0.65 in 1984, but they 
surprisingly reached 1.16 and 1.10 in 1985. The large decline from 1983 to 1984 
could be explained by the change in statistics of rural population. In spite of natural 
growth of population, statistics of national rural population declined about 10 percent 
from 1983 to 1984, however, rural population in Guangdong decline only 4.4 percent 
and at the same time urban population increased at similar ratio in both mainland 
China and Guangdong. Hence, the lower urbanization speed might be the statistical 
explanation for the decline of Guangdong’s agricultural and nonagricultural indexes16
 
.  
  Could Guangdong province becomes a counter example of the finding that to reach 
the second quadrant may be the first step of entering the first one, or agricultural 
development comes first? Guangdong province represents the famous Pearl River 
Delta model in which rural industries were stimulated by foreign investment and the 
majority came from Hong Kong. Although other coastal provinces may share the 
common characters of large number of foreign investment and light, labor intensive 
products, another two features make Guangdong unique: 1) rural industries are mainly 
export-oriented; 2) fast and abundant capital accumulation result in large factories 
which welcome large number of surplus rural labor from other provinces. Hence, rural 
industries’ development was capable of relying on labor, capital and market outside 
Guangdong, instead of domestic agricultural sector. Thus relationship between 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors is vague in this case and the development 
from 1981 to 1985 in Guangdong could be explained that the effects of large number 
                                                             
16  Data calculated in this paragraph come from NBSC (1981, 1983, 1984 and 1985).   
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of foreign capital investment took long time to appear.  
 
  Moreover, to reach the second quadrant is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for entering the first one. Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Hubei located 
in the second quadrant in1981, 1990 and 1995, and Hainan, the new province, joined 
them in 1990 and 1995. Agricultural sectors in most of provinces are diversified and 
have more profitable products than rice as their main products: beet, wheat, and bean 
in Heilongjiang; animal husbandry in Inner Mongolia; fruit and cotton in Xinjiang; 
tropical fruit in Hainan. Hubei, Heilongjiang and Jilin together with Anhui and Hunan 
which fell into the third quadrant from the second one in 1990, had a larger portion of 
nonagricultural output to GDP in rural area than other provinces in this quadrant in 
1990 (see Table 4.1) but they failed to make a shift to the first quadrant as Fujian and 
Shandong did when they were in the second one. At last Jilin province is special case 
considering that it was the only province fell out of the first quadrant to the third and 
then went to the second one, moreover it used to be the only non-coastal province in 
the first quadrant. 
 
  All in all, comparing with many inland provinces especially Hubei, Heilongjiang 
Jilin, Anhui and Hunan province, Guangdong, Tianjin, Fujian and Shandong’s 
transition combined with conditions of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Beijing and 
Shanghai already in the first quadrant implies that large municipalities (also border on 
the sea, except Beijing) and coastal provinces were much more well off in the reform 
and opening up and easier to enter the first quadrant than the rest17
 
. 
4.3.2. Factors behind the diversified transition 
Economic transitions in mainland China varied among provinces or regions, but 
generally support the argument of agricultural-development-led industrialization, 
because one of the findings argues that agricultural development should come first in 
economic transition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for entering the first 
                                                             
17  The outliers include Guangxi autonomous region and Hainan, a newly founded province.   
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quadrant. Moreover, another finding suggested that large municipalities and coastal 
provinces were well off and easy to get in the first quadrant. Hence, we can jump to a 
conclusion that there are two factors behind the diversified transition: agricultural 
development and locations of province.  
 
  Obviously this argument is superficial and has neglected many factors in economic 
transition. Lin and Yang (2001) have carried a comprehensive comparative analysis of 
factors in rural enterprises’ development in mainland China. Findings from Lin and 
Yang (2001) and this thesis are complementary, though the former is more focus on 
regression test on specific factors behind rural enterprises’ development. Lin and Yang 
(2001) conclude that 1) coastal provinces are in more advantageous position than the 
rest of the country; 2) higher income is important to drive rural enterprises’ 
development; and 3) world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) help rural 
enterprises’ development (p 179).  
 
  Lin and Yang (2001) also found transportation facilities, type of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) 18
 
, and capital endowment of the province influenced rural 
enterprises. However, the latter two findings might be questionable. Foreign 
investment and agricultural revenue can compensate low capital endowment so as to 
build a larger rural nonagricultural sector. As mentioned in previous sector, special 
development institutions abated the disadvantage of outdated technique in rural 
enterprises. However, this thesis won’t converge on the discussion of specific factors 
but go back to the framework of economic transition.  
  Is there any province which acquired most of those factors and would have 
developed along with those municipalities and coastal provinces? The answer is 
positive and Hubei province is one of them. Hubei province was in the second 
                                                             
18  Lin  and  Yang  (2001)  believe  there  is  a  relationship  (technology  transfer)  between  SOE  and  rural  industries. 
Since  rural  industries  are  normally  labor  intensive  and  light  in  mainland  China  aligned  with  comparative 
advantage of abundant labor, lighter SOEs in a province are more likely to foster rural industries’ development (p 
166).   
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quadrant of higher agricultural performance than national level in 1981, 1990 and 
1995, which means capital was more likely to accumulate from agricultural revenue 
for rural nonagricultural sectors. Transportation is convenient and developed, since 
Yangzi River runs through the province from west to east and railway connects 
Beijing and Guangdong from north to south. Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, is the 
largest and most developed cities in middle China, and one of the metropolises in 
mainland China. Wuhan together with large region around it was a heavily invested 
industry center in middle China, which implies solid industry foundation for 
development. Why Hubei lagged behind? The only factor from above paragraphs can 
be used in explanation is that Hubei is not a coastal province and had no access to FDI 
and foreign market.  
 
  It seems that until now in most cases location of east and coastal can guarantee FDI, 
foreign market and economic development, but there is one fact in the reform and 
opening up hasn’t been discussed. East coastal provinces and municipalities got 
developed and had access to FDI and foreign market because of the “cautious, 
incremental and geographically localized” (Naughton, 2007, p 402) economic reform 
in early age. Guangdong and Fujian were the only two provinces in which four special 
economic zones (SEZs)19 were founded from 1979 to 1980 so as to attract foreign 
investment. And in the 1980s steadily increased foreign investment brought great 
changes to the two provinces. The second wave of opening up started in 1984 and 
fourteen new “open cities” were set up but all of them located in east coastal 
provinces20
                                                             
19  The four SEZs are Zhuhai, Shenzhen and Shantou in Guangdong and Xiamen in Fujian. 
. In 1988, Hainan province was founded and at the same time became a 
SEZ. Therefore, since 1988 all east coastal provinces from Liaoning in northeast to 
Guangxi in southeast have either several SEZs or open cities. In those SEZs and open 
cities, since there were few SOEs in rural areas, “the implication was that foreign 
investors were encouraged to set up subsidiaries and joint ventures with rural 
collectives that would make use of low-cost rural labor outside the framework of the 
20  The  fourteen  open  cities  include  Dalian,  Qinhuangdao,  Tianjin,  Yantai,  Qingdao,  Lianyungang,  Nantong, 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.     
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planned economy” (ibid., p 409). Guangdong and Fujian were the only two leading 
provinces in absorbing FDI since economic reform and later they were followed by 
other coastal provinces (ibid., p 405), because SEZs and open cities were allowed to 
offer competing packages of preferential policies to attract foreign investors.  
 
  Therefore, economic transitions were influenced by this dual-track, incremental 
reform in which new system worked along with the existing one and finally replaced 
the latter. Inland provinces had no access to FDI or foreign market in the first place 
and then lost advantage in competition for them with coastal provinces, even if some 
of them had good economic conditions.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Mainland China’s economic transition was once again proved generally support the 
model of agricultural-development-led industrialization in this section since the 
provincial analysis found a strong correlation between development of agricultural 
sector and nonagricultural sectors, and this correlation strengthened from 1981 to 
1990 and 1995.  
 
However, provinces in mainland China were far from sharing one growth model. 
Many a province legged behind in industrialization process, while coastal provinces 
and big municipalities were leading the economic transition. After comparing 
provincial GDP per capita of both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors to national 
level, provinces in mainland China can be divided into four quadrants and later three 
quadrants in 1995 case. Provinces in the first quadrant of higher agricultural and 
nonagricultural output per capita are all coastal provinces and municipalities. The 
other two quadrants are consisted of middle and western provinces with lower 
agricultural or (and) nonagricultural output per capita. 
 
The analysis of the two general trends of economic transition (a large decline of 
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province number in the fourth quadrant; and an increase of total number of provinces 
in the first and third quadrants) together with respective studies of Guangdong and 
provinces in the second quadrant found that 1) growth of better nonagricultural but 
lower agricultural performance might be unsustainable; 2) the second quadrant is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for entering the first one, or agricultural sector 
should develop first; and 3) big municipalities and coastal provinces were much more 
well off in the “reform and opening up” and easier to enter the first quadrant than the 
rest. 
 
Moreover, the feature of dual-track, incremental and geographically localized in 
The “Reform and Opening-up” was demonstrated to be a very important factor of the 
uneven economic transitions among provinces in mainland China. Center policies 
deliberately made provinces grow with different speeds by providing the east coastal 
provinces with access to FDI and foreign market in the early age of reform.  
 
5. Income distribution in economic transition 
In mainland China economic transition generally took the road of 
agricultural-development-led industrialization, and started from agricultural sector at 
the beginning of economic reform. Successful agricultural development kept bringing 
total output to higher levels so as to raise increasing number of people. Income from 
farming kept rising up so as household savings. Meanwhile, the secular decline of 
agriculture brought more surplus labor, because productivity rate increased and less 
labor could produce more products. Those all stimulated the development of 
subsistent rural enterprises. Successful agricultural-development-led industrialization 
largely contributed to fast and long term economic growth and large scale of poverty 
alleviation to mainland China, just like the Taiwan case. However this process was 
uneven and at unequal rates among provinces in mainland China, which partially 
resulted from not only many factors of diverse endowment and agricultural 
development, but also unequal access to FDI and foreign market. 
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Actually the question of inequality in mainland China has partially been solved 
since previous section has proved there’s no universal economic transition model 
among provinces and they could be divided into four or three groups with different 
levels of agricultural and nonagricultural production. Uneven progress and different 
patterns of economic transition among provinces probably resulted in the high 
inequality of mainland China.  
   
  In household income, farm income and wages from nonagricultural sectors are 
different from one province to another. In provinces from the first quadrant income 
are probably much higher than the rest since they have a higher GDP per capita of 
both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Normally wages from nonagricultural 
sectors are much higher than farm income so the urban-rural income gap can be 
narrowed and peasants can get out of poverty if adequate nonagricultural jobs are 
available for rural surplus labor (see Section 2.2). However, because nonagricultural 
sectors among provinces grow at different speeds, the capabilities of siphoning off 
surplus labor are barely at the same level. In some province surplus labor have no 
access to enough nonagricultural jobs, while others, like Guangdong, actively attracts 
more labor from inland provinces to satisfy their rural industries, so intra-rural 
inequality may rise because of the unequal opportunities to jobs. Different agricultural 
output per capita means uneven farm income among provinces and an un-equalizing 
effect of household income as farm income still constitutes the main component of 
rural household income especially in middle and western provinces. Moreover Table 
4.1 shows that agricultural output in those inland provinces was higher than half of 
total rural output in 1990, and agricultural sector employ much more labors than 
nonagricultural sectors. Hence unequal farm income will also cause inequality in 
China, though it’s lower than wages and more reliable on poverty alleviation and 
inequality reduction (see Section 2.2). To sum up, uneven economic development 
resulted in inequality of income distribution in mainland China. 
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Findings from household income and distribution analysis in Khan and Riskin 
(1998 and 2005) as well as Ravallion and Chen (2007) on poverty alleviation are 
congenial with above analysis: 1) farm income, the largest source of rural income, has 
a positive effect on improving income distribution; and 2) wage is the most important 
disequalizing effect on rural income distribution, however has an equalizing effect on 
national income distribution (Khan and Riskin, 2005, p377; 1998, p 246-249; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2007, p 2, 38). Khan and Riskin’s research also shows the 
evolution of wages’ role in income distribution. At first wages was the only 
component in rural income that was disequalizing for China as a whole between 1988 
and 1995 (Khan and Riskin, 1998, p 246), because the average wage was higher 
relative to rural per capita income (Mellor, 1966, p 32); wages as source for income is 
only available for a few people; and wages are probably concentrated in higher 
income regions (Khan and Riskin, 1998, p 238). The comparing of 1995 and 2002 
shows a reduction of disequalizing effect of wages and they have a strongly 
equalizing effect on national income distribution while making rural income unequal 
(Khan and Riskin, 2005, p 377- 378) as the rural and urban employment grew rapidly 
and the regional inequality of access to wage employment were reduced (ibid., p 
364-365). Moreover Khan and Riskin (1998) claimed that compositions of income 
between the rich and the poor in rural area are different, for the principal sources of 
the rich are wages employment and non-farm entrepreneurship, but farming and rental 
values for the poor (p 240).  
 
Together with discussion of inequality and poverty in section 2.2, above findings 
suggest that the improvement of income distribution in mainland China largely relies 
on the development of rural economy. Associated with lower inequality overall 
economy (Ravallion and Chen, 2007, p 23) the growth of agriculture brings more 
farm income to household and will especially benefit the rural poor of whom farm 
income is the main source of household income. Development of agriculture can 
improve conditions of provinces in the third quadrant of lower GDP per capita and 
reduce intra-rural inequality. The growth of rural nonagricultural sectors can provide 
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more wage employments, so as to reduce the regional inequality of acquiring jobs in 
higher income modern sectors. That will enable provinces in the second and the third 
quadrant to catch up with their peers in the first quadrant. However, the growth of 
rural enterprises can’t be a panacea for every province today. Due to diversified nature 
endowments provinces like Tibet and Inner Mongolia are not suitable for building 
large numbers of industries. Moreover the favorable environment for rural enterprises 
development is no longer existed and rural markets of inland provinces have already 
been taken by the firms from east coastal provinces. Thus development of rural 
nonagricultural sector among inland provinces should probably count on transferring 
firms from eastern areas because of the rising production costs, and changes in center 
policies. Through migration a large number of surplus labors can involve in 
high-income sectors of economy so the national income gap will decline, but the 
intra-urban inequality will rise up (Khan and Riskin, 2005, p 358)”: since migrants 
consist of rural surplus labors who are linked to rural economic growth through 
migration, transfer and trade, rural economic development can also reduce intra-urban 
inequality (Ravallion and Chen, 2007, p 23-24). 
 
To put in a nutshell, inequality in mainland China largely resulted from uneven 
progress of provincial development. Reduction of poverty and inequality in mainland 
China relies on the development of rural economy, especially agricultural 
development of inland provinces.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis has accomplished its purpose and provided answers to all research 
questions. The economic transition in mainland China after 1978 generally followed 
processes of the agricultural-development-led industrialization, just as Taiwan’s 
development, and had better conditions for development. However, provinces in 
mainland China took different steps in their transitions partially resulting from 
unequal access to FDI and foreign market. Therefore, in mainland China the 
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long-term and fast economic growth as well as poverty alleviation was contributed by 
the successful agriculture-led economic transition, however uneven economic 
transitions among provinces brought unequal household incomes and deteriorated 
income inequalities to China. Now Mellor’s theory is still useful in mainland China’s 
development precisely how inland provinces can catch up with eastern coastal 
provinces and municipalities and narrow down the income gap. Based on the first two 
findings in section 4.4, discussion on rural household income in section 5 and 
Aldeman’s argument in section 2.2, this thesis proposes that among inland provinces 
particularly those with lower agricultural output per capita than national level, 
development of rural economy should be paid utmost attention, especially the 
development of agricultural sector.  
 
  There are several implications from mainland China case which may be applicable 
to other developing countries: 1) agricultural-development-led industrialization can 
contribute to fast economic growth and poverty alleviation; 2) agricultural sector 
should develop first; and 3) growth with better nonagricultural but lower agricultural 
performance is probably unsustainable. Moreover, if we can find a proper coordinate 
origin then the method of categorizing provinces may be applicable to analyze other 
developing countries. 
 
  Mellor’s agriculture-led economic development theory has a presupposition that in 
less developed countries capital is scarce and has a slow accumulation rate, 
meanwhile foreign capital and demand are normally not that reliable as domestic 
saving from agricultural development as a source for capital accumulation (Mellor, 
1966, p 81-85; Mellor, 1995, p 2). However, a theoretical implication of this thesis is 
that Mellor’s theory would be more applicable in opening economy if it contained 
discussions on foreign capital and market. Moreover, discussion on how to utilize 
foreign capital and market is more important than how to acquire them. Successful 
experiences from Guangdong and Fujian provinces suggest that channeling foreign 
capital and market to rural economy in the model of agricultural-development-led 
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industrialization is promising and effective in economic development21
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
21  Comparing  Korea with  Guangdong  and  Fujian  cases  is  necessary  since  they  all  enjoyed  foreign market  and 
foreign investment or savings, yet the economic development sequence of the former is reverse with the latter 
two:  supported  by  foreign  savings  industries  in  Korea  preceded  rural  development  and  support  agriculture 
sector(Ho,  1982,  p  983).  Moreover,  there  will  be  more  findings  relate  to  debates  of  Free Market  theory  and 
Governed  Market  theory  about  to  what  extent  government  should  influence  economy,  considering  that 
government  interventions  aggravated  problems  from  initial  conditions  in  Korea,  while  CCP  provided  open 
environment  for  development.  The  reverse  track  of  development  could  partially  result  from  government 
interventions.  See  Lin  and  Yao  (2001),  p  180‐182,  Ho,  1982,  p  973,  982,  and  983,  and Wade  (2004)  for  Free 
Market and Governed Market theories. 
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Appendix 
Map of China produced by State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, P.R. China (June, 
2008). See next page.  

